Chicago-Kent College of Law
From the SelectedWorks of Alexander Boni-Saenz

June, 2020

Empirical Inheritance Law
Alexander Boni-Saenz

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/alexander_boni-saenz/27/

Empirical Inheritance Law
Alexander A. Boni-Saenz*
Empirical legal scholars tell it like it is.1 The nature of the “it” that we
might want to know about varies significantly by legal field, however,
and it also differs based on one’s scholarly position within that field.
This Comment explores the major ways that empirical legal scholarship
can be valuable to those of us working on normative or theoretical legal
scholarship in inheritance law.2
In order to describe how empirics might be useful, it is important to
distinguish between the first-order and second-order normative
questions that they might inform. In the trusts and estates field, the
first-order normative question is what the end goals of the inheritance
system should be.3 To the extent that the primary principle in
inheritance law is the freedom of disposition, the inheritance system

* Copyright © 2020 Alexander A. Boni-Saenz. Associate Professor of Law, ChicagoKent College of Law. I would like to thank Adam Hirsch, David Horton, the participants
in the American College of Trusts and Estates Counsel Symposium, and the editors at
the UC Davis Law Review.
1 And increasingly, they have a broader audience. See Shari Seidman Diamond,
Empirical Legal Scholarship: Observations on Moving Forward, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1229,
1229 (2019) (“Empirical legal scholarship was once a novel and contested participant
in the legal academy. In the twenty-first century, it has emerged as an active and valued
player.”); Kathryn Zeiler, The Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Where Might We Go
from Here? , 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 78, 78 (2016) (“The number of empirical legal studies
that show up in the pages of journals has been on the rise as empirical methods improve
and researchers gain easy access to a growing number of data sets. This addition to legal
scholarship is welcome after decades of theory’s dominance.”).
2 Normative and theoretical legal scholarship also has much to provide empirical
legal scholars, though that is not the focus of this Comment. See Mark C. Suchman &
Elizabeth Mertz, Toward A New Legal Empiricism: Empirical Legal Studies and New Legal
Realism, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 555, 574 (2010) (“Although disciplinary social
science relies on empirical methods to generate reliable answers, it relies on theoretical
models to generate important questions and to organize isolated findings into coherent
accounts.”).
3 See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration
Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 811 (2007) (noting that first-order issues address the end
goals of the relevant legal system).
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should broadly strive to implement donative intent.4 The primacy of the
freedom of disposition, however, is contested by other policy goals,
such as protecting the family from disinheritance, putting temporal
limits on donative intent, and reclaiming wealth for use by the state.5
First-order normative discussions center primarily on when we should
favor the freedom of disposition or one of these other goals in the
inheritance system. Empirical legal scholarship has comparatively less
to contribute to these “pure” normative debates, as they occur largely at
the level of theory.
On the other hand, such scholarship adds significant value to the
second-order normative questions of inheritance law. These are matters
of system design and concern how we implement the first-order
normative goals in legal doctrines and institutions.6 In addition, they
implicate the normative goals of efficiency and just distribution. In other
words, all other things being equal, we would prefer the least costly
inheritance system that also accomplishes our favored first-order
normative goals.7 This is the efficiency goal. However, we would also
prefer an inheritance system that implements first-order normative goals
in a fair way across the population.8 This is the just distribution goal.
Given these different types of normative questions and answers, what
are the biggest targets for empirical legal inquiry in inheritance law?
The normative importance of donative intent makes it the first “it” that
empirical legal scholars might helpfully illuminate. In doing this,
empiricists face a similar obstacle as courts do when they consider
evidence of donative intent in the context of wills or trusts after the
death of the testator or settlor respectively. The best dataset — the
expressed preferences of the deceased — is not available, as decedents

4 See In re Gustafson, 547 N.E.2d 1152, 1153 (N.Y. 1989) (“[The court’s] primary
function is to effectuate the testator’s intent . . . .”); John H. Langbein, Substantial
Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1975) (“[V]irtually the entire
law of wills derives from the premise that an owner is entitled to dispose of his property
as he pleases in death as in life.”).
5 See Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Distributive Justice and Donative Intent, 65 UCLA L.
REV. 324, 331 (2018) (describing these policy exceptions).
6 See Cox & Posner, supra note 3, at 811 (“Second-order design issues concern the
legal institutions that are used to implement the first-order policy goals.”).
7 See Daniel B. Kelly, Toward Economic Analysis of the Uniform Probate Code, 45 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 855, 862-65 (2012) (arguing for the economic analysis of wills law);
Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 648-49
(2004) (applying an agency costs analysis to the law of trusts).
8 See Boni-Saenz, supra note 5, at 342-43 (arguing for the incorporation of
distributive justice principles into evaluations of the inheritance law system).

2020]

Empirical Inheritance Law

2643

do not make good interview subjects.9 Empiricists can still make
progress on questions of donative intent by gathering data that might
inform the construction of the default rules of inheritance law. Through
survey techniques, we can discover the majority’s preferences on
different topics and implement them in intestacy statutes or the
subsidiary law of wills.10 When that is not possible or practical, we can
ascertain what people believe the legal rule is and use that to guide
default rule construction, as Adam Hirsch has artfully argued in his
empirical study of the doctrine of revival.11
An interesting and unresolved problem remains, however, for the use
of empirical evidence in the construction of default rules. In at least
some cases, there will be no clear majority preference on some issue.
This may be because a preference only commands a slim majority and
may be within the margin of error. Or perhaps there are multiple
options, none of which garner majority support. Knowing this is itself
useful, as it indicates that we may need to resort to some other
normative consideration beyond donative intent to structure the law.
This opens up the possibility of embracing other types of defaults under
some circumstances.12
The second “it” that empirical legal scholars can describe is the law
in action. This refers to how the inheritance regime actually works on
the ground, taking into account relevant legal doctrines but also the
various other components of the legal system, including people,
institutions, and norms.13 Knowing how the inheritance regime works
9 See Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous
Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1941) (“[T]he testator will inevitably be dead and therefore
unable to testify when the issue is tried.”). Empirical legal scholars can still make some
headway on this question of decedent intent by considering a wider range of evidence
than was available to the court at the time of a particular case, either because it was
excluded by the rules of evidence, came to light later, or required more sustained
investigation to uncover.
10 See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58
ST. LOUIS L.J. 643, 645 (2014) (describing intestacy statues as an “estate plan by
default”); id. at 655 (describing the subsidiary law of wills as in part “the rules of
construction, which evolved out of long experience with interpreting and administering
testamentary dispositions in accordance with the donor’s probable intent”).
11 See generally Adam J. Hirsch, Waking the Dead: An Empirical Analysis of Revival
of Wills, 53 UC DAVIS L. REV. 2269 (2020).
12 See Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its
Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1042-61 (2004) (discussing social defaults as an
alternative to majoritarian defaults).
13 See Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal Realism: “Things Ain’t What
They Used to Be,” 2005 WIS. L. REV. 365, 388 (2005) (understanding the “‘law in action’
to include both the gaps between the law on the books and what happened in legal
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can help us evaluate whether it is working as intended. For example,
Emily Poppe’s meticulous and comprehensive empirical study of
testation demographics focuses on the people element of the inheritance
system, highlighting exactly who is engaging in estate planning and in
what ways.14 This type of study is particularly important for
understanding whether our inheritance system is working well to
implement donative intent for all sectors of the population, rather than
just for those who have access to expensive legal counsel.15 The better
we understand the law in action, the better we can design a system that
implements first-order normative goals in an efficient and fair way.
The need to understand the law in action also persists over time, as
we must make sure that legal doctrine is a good fit with the present
socio-legal context. Consider the elective share. It has traditionally been
understood as a way to protect less economically powerful spouses —
often women — who might otherwise be disinherited after participating
in a years-long marital partnership.16 Naomi Cahn’s study of the elective
share case law suggests that it is not the first spouse who typically uses
the elective share, but instead spouses of subsequent marriages, often in
opposition to children of the decedent spouse’s earlier marriage.17 This
is relevant because it may be the first spouse who entered into the
economic partnership that generated the bulk of family wealth, though
this is also an empirical question. Similarly, in Jeffrey Pennell’s study of
spousal disinheritance, he finds that in Georgia — the rare state without
an elective share statute — it is more often wives who disinherit their
husbands, and seemingly for “the ‘right’ reasons.”18 Studies like these
can lead us to reevaluate the factual predicates for various normative
theories or arguments that we might hold dear.
The third “it” of particular empirical interest is the set of normative
trade-offs in inheritance system design. Such trade-offs are inevitable,
and they stem from balancing different normative goals and the
institutions, and, the way problems were avoided, suppressed, and dealt with apart from
official public norms, sanctions, and institutions”).
14 See Emily S. Taylor Poppe, Surprised by the Inevitable: A National Survey of Estate
Planning Utilization, 53 UC DAVIS L. REV. 2511, 2540-55 (2020).
15 See Boni-Saenz, supra note 5, at 348 (“The donor population is . . . diverse in that
it includes those wealthy enough to employ attorneys as well as those who do not have
significant assets.”).
16 See Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 83, 99-113 (1994) (discussing the evolving rationales for the elective share).
17 See Naomi Cahn, What’s Wrong About the Elective Share “Right”? , 53 UC DAVIS L.
REV. 2087, 2101-06 (2020).
18 Jeffrey N. Pennell, Individuated Determination of a Surviving Spouse’s Elective
Share, 53 UC DAVIS L. REV. 2473, 2485 (2020).
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difficulties in implementing those conflicting normative goals through
institutions and legal actors.19 These trade-offs cannot be fully
considered in the abstract, as they take on different forms based on the
legal doctrine in question and the socio-legal context in which that
doctrine operates. Empiricists can help identify and explain these tradeoffs.
David Horton’s empirical study of do-it-yourself wills is a perfect
example of empirical legal scholarship in this vein. He describes how
do-it-yourself wills entail both increased access to testation for people
in a variety of circumstances, including those in ill health, while also
statistically increasing the odds of litigation.20 This illustrates
something of a trade-off between the goals of implementing donative
intent, pursuing an efficient inheritance system, and ensuring that
donative intent is implemented across the donor population in a fair
way. Horton’s study confirms the presence of the trade-off, but perhaps
more importantly paints a fuller picture of its scope. This creates fertile
ground for a more nuanced and sophisticated scholarly discussion
going forward.
Normative legal scholars tell it like it should be. But we need to know
what “it” is before we can do so. For this, we are reliant on empirical
legal scholars, who enrich the scholarly discussion, help refine
normative theories, and suggest new avenues for legal reform of the
inheritance system.

19 See J.B. Ruhl, Managing Systemic Risk in Legal Systems, 89 IND. L.J. 559, 575-76
(2014) (“Understanding these tradeoffs and the constraints on system functionality they
produce lies at the heart of the design challenge for robustness of legal systems.”).
20 See David Horton, Do-It-Yourself Wills, 53 UC DAVIS L. REV. 2357, 2386-95
(2020).

